Payments to informants (FOI ref: 698/26)
Request
1. The total amount of money paid by West Midlands Police to informants (also known as Covert Human Intelligence Sources) over the past five complete financial years (2020/21 to 2024/25).
2. Please provide a breakdown of the amount paid to informants for each individual year within this period.
Response
1. The total amount of money paid by West Midlands Police to informants (also known as Covert Human Intelligence Sources) over the past five complete financial years (2020/21 to 2024/25).
Five-year total (2020/21 to 2024/25) = £1,253,432
2. Please provide a breakdown of the amount paid to informants for each individual year within this period.
2020-2021 - £272,931
2021-2022 - £226,511
2022-2023 - £297,240
2023-2024 - £250,565
2024-2025 - £206,185
In addition to the information provided, West Midlands Police can neither confirm nor deny that it holds any other information relevant to this request as the duty in Section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply by virtue of the following exemptions:
Section 23(5) - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters
Section 24(2) – National security
Section 30(3) – Investigations and proceedings conducted by public authorities
Section 23(5):
Section 23 is a class based absolute exemption. Confirming or denying whether any additional CHIS related information is held would reveal information supplied by, or relating to, bodies listed in section 23(3). The Act therefore prohibits confirmation or denial.
Section 24(2):
Section 24 is a prejudice based exemption. To confirm or deny the existence of further information would undermine national security by damaging the confidence of CHIS who assist the police and by enabling hostile individuals to draw inferences about the level or nature of covert activity in a force area. This prejudice would arise even where no national security related CHIS are in use.
Section 30(3):
Section 30 is a class based qualified exemption. Confirming or denying whether additional information is held would provide insight into policing’s covert capabilities, allowing offenders to adjust behaviour to avoid detection and undermining investigative and intelligence gathering functions.
Harm (Section 24)
Confirming or denying the existence of any additional CHIS related information would risk undermining national security by damaging the recruitment, retention and confidence of individuals who assist law enforcement as covert sources. Even the perception that CHIS related information might be inferred from FOI responses can cause reluctance to engage with the police. Confirming or denying whether further material exists would allow individuals, hostile groups or organised criminals to infer whether covert activity is, or is not, taking place in a particular force area. These inferences could then be used to adapt behaviour to evade detection, identify covert tactics, or target individuals suspected of involvement in covert intelligence. This would compromise national security and threaten public safety.
Factors Favouring Confirmation or Denial (Sections 24 and 30)
There is a public interest in demonstrating that policing is transparent about its use of public funds and its management of covert capabilities. Confirming or denying the existence of further information could help the public understand high level structures around how CHIS are used and may support informed public debate about the appropriateness and proportionality of covert policing tactics. Public awareness of policing processes can contribute to confidence in the accountability of law enforcement.
Factors Against Confirmation or Denial (Sections 24 and 30)
However, confirming or denying whether additional CHIS related material exists would reveal whether the force holds covert information of a sensitive nature, enabling individuals to infer operational capability, levels of covert activity, or the presence or absence of CHIS within the force area. Such inferences could be used by offenders or hostile groups to avoid detection, frustrate investigations, or exploit perceived gaps in covert coverage. Confirmation or denial would also undermine the confidence of existing or potential CHIS by suggesting their involvement could be indirectly exposed. This would damage intelligence gathering and hinder the prevention and detection of crime. In addition, any suggestion of covert arrangements in a specific area could place individuals at risk of harm.
Balance Test (Sections 24 and 30)
Although transparency supports accountability and public confidence, the risks associated with confirming or denying the existence of further CHIS related information are substantial. Disclosure would prejudice national security by undermining covert capabilities, discouraging CHIS cooperation, and enabling hostile actors to exploit operational sensitivities. The public interest in protecting covert operations, safeguarding individuals and maintaining the effectiveness of intelligence led policing outweighs the arguments in favour of confirmation or denial. The partial NCND under sections 23(5), 24(2) and 30(3) is therefore upheld.